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INTRODUCTION
The question before this Court is whether a developer who negotiates to purchase
land at a significantly reduced price, due in large part to the lack of water rights, can
come to a water company, which consists of the other individual lot owners, and demand
that they provide the water the developer knew was lacking. The developer is seeking to
make all of the other individual property owners help pay to purchase the water the
developer knew it would need for the property. Furthermore, many of these individuals
purchased their lots directly from the developer, who affirmatively asserted there was
more than sufficient water for their lots.
The developer would lead this court to believe the water company is a faceless
corporate entity. The truth is that the water company is made entirely of lot owners in the
Canyon Meadows subdivision and it is managed by private individuals willing to sacrifice
their own personal time in an effort to help the tiny community. There is no justification
for granting the developer a windfall by acquiring the property at a greatly reduced
purchase price, selling the lots at a significantly increased rate, and then forcing innocent
third-party lot owners to bear the burden of purchasing the water the developer knew the
property lacked. Unfortunately, a significant portion of this reply brief has to be spent
rebutting malicious and false allegations made by the developer, but when the Court
reviews the record, it becomes apparent that the water company has been forthright and
that there are legal bases to overturn the trial court and find for the water company.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In its opposition brief, the developer has misstated the standard of review, citing
the "clearly erroneous" standard associated with a review of findings of fact regarding a
grant of a preliminary injunction rather than the standard of review pertinent to appeals
from a grant of summary judgment. In this case, the water company is appealing from an
adverse ruling on summary judgment. Therefore, the correct standard of review is that
summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact in
dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reviewing a
grant of summary judgment, this Court accords no deference to the trial court's
conclusions of law; the trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. In
evaluating whether the trail court was correct in ruling there was no genuine issue of
material fact, the Court views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See Canyon Meadows Home Owners v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT
App 414, If 8, 40 P.3d 1148, 1151.
Furthermore, when the developer presents the findings of facts Judge Ray Harding
Jr. entered granting the preliminary injunction that began this action (see the developer's
brief, pages 5-9), the developer fails to point out that Judge Harding handwrote into the
order that these findings were only for purposes of the developer's motion for preliminary
injunction (R. 1352), and that the order was only intended to be binding "until a final
order is entered in this Action." (R. at 1339.)
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Finally, this matter was set to be presented to a jury. (R. 1378.) It is well
established in Utah that when a matter is set for a jury, it is the jury that is the ultimate
finder of fact, not the judge. Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, Tfl8. 57 P.3d 997 (it was
error for the district court to determine questions of fact when the party had requested a
jury). Had Judge Howard not granted summary judgment to the developer, the jury's
ability to find facts would not have been limited or restrained by the fact that Judge
Harding Jr. had made limited findings relating only to the motion for a preliminary
injunction. As this was only a preliminary injunction and not a permanent order, Judge
Harding Jr. correctly recognized the limits of his findings. This Court should hold that
the developer's argument on the standard of review is without merit.
REPLY TO THE DEVELOPER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.
I. The Developer Makes Representations of Fact Without Proper Citation to the
Record.
On page 2 of its brief, the developer asserts that the quit claim deed by which it
acquired its interest in Canyon Meadows "specifically stated that the appurtenant water
rights were conveyed together with the real property." However, the only citation to the
record it gives in support of this statement is to page 369 of the record. This citation
refers to an affidavit of Arden A. Engebretsen that does not even mention the quit claim
deed, much less recite its specific language. The only quit claim deed the water company
can locate in the record is at page 1858, and it does not contain any such language as cited
by the developer. Indeed to the contrary, the sales agreement between the FDIC and Jay
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Johnson expressly waives any warranty as to water and makes it perfectly clear that the
property was being purchased UAS IS" and "WITH ALL FAULTS." (R. at 1869.)
Furthermore, in an attempt to support its position that there is sufficient water in
the subdivision, the developer refers to the testimony of its own engineer as the "only
competent" testimony, which is "unrebutted." See page 4 of the developer's brief.
Again, the only citation the developer offers in support of this statement of fact refers to
the affidavits of its engineer, and there is nothing to support the assertion that his
testimony is unrebutted or is the only competent evidence in the record. Once more, the
exact opposite is true. The water company put on evidence from Dee Hansen, a
registered professional engineer with over 39 years of experience in the field of water
resources issues and who served as the State Engineer and Director of the Utah Division
of Water Rights, and as the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural
Resources. (R. at 2024.) Mr. Hansen's testimony is as follows (R. at 2023-2022):
Currently the Water Company has enough water available to its
system to provide 1600 GPD for 40 lots based on the 72 acre feet
available from Little Deer Creek . . . . This does not include water
needed for irrigation to the common area plus water necessary for
fire protection to the subdivision. . . . The Water Company does not
have enough water to satisfy the State's minimum irrigation
requirements.
The former director of the state division of water rights is surely competent to testify and
he unambiguously declared the subdivision has inadequate water.
The developer also states that if water is not provided to the lots they "will lie
fallow and cannot be sold or developed." Once again the developer's only cite is to an
-4-

affidavit of Arden Engebretsen in which he discusses the need for water to meet
residential need, but there in nothing concerning the inability to purchase additional water
rights, or any other circumstance that would cause the lots to lay fallow or be wasted.
Indeed, in negotiating the purchase of the property Jay Johnson, expressly acknowledges
that it was contemplated usable lots would have to be reduced OR additional water would
have to be purchased ( R at 1876):
Water availability for the development is limited. Earlier proposals by the
previous developer received approval for 74 dwelling units but with water
allocations only for domestic use (inside the house). No water was
allocated for irrigation of landscaping. Landscaping represents 60% of the
typical water allocations for a residence. Therefore to be able to provide a
normal water allocation which would allow landscape irrigation, the
number of units would have to be reduced by 60%. The other alternative is
to purchase additional water in the area which has a surplus of water share.
This complicates things very much and is not readily available.
II. The Water Company Has Made No False or Unfounded Statements of Material
Fact
In its opposition brief, the developer has levied serious allegations against the
water company, charging the water company with making unfounded and false statements
in bad faith and attempting to mislead this Court. (Developer's brief at 10-13.) Despite
the vigor and presumed certainty with which the developer levies these charges against
the water company, the facts will show that the water company has made no false or
unfounded statements and has not mislead this Court in any way.
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A. There Is a Strong Relationship Between Jay Johnson and the Developer.
There is an abundance of evidence in the record substantiating the connection
between Jay Johnson and the developer. Mahli Development was a partnership between
John Mahli and Jay Johnson (R. at 1889) and while the letterhead for Mahli Development
was used in one of the letters cited by the water company, every letter was personally
signed by Jay Johnson. It is Jay Johnson, not Mahli Development, that acted for the
developer.
Jay Johnson was aware of the Canyon Meadows property and was interested in
purchasing it. Jay Johnson performed due diligence on the property, became aware of
problems with the property, including percolation and water rights, and negotiated the
purchase price. (R. at 1886-1875.)
Jay Johnson needed a funding source to purchase the property, and was put in
contact with Arden A. Engebretsen. The following is an excerpt from Jay Johnson's
deposition.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

No. I was just introduced to him.
And how did he introduce you to Mr. Engebretsen?
He set up a meeting for us to meet together.
And where did that meeting occur?
I don't remember. It's a little fuzzy. It was either Salt Lake or
Provo, but I'm not sure.
Okay. What was the nature of the conversation with Mr.
Engebretsen at that time?
I explained to him that we had the rights to - 1 had the rights to
purchase the property, showed him the documentation of what we
had. I suggested we'd consider forming a partnership.
* * *
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Q.
A.

At this time, you had already given the F.D.I.C. an option or entered
into some kind of an agreement?
Yes.

(R. at 1891.) Together Jay Johnson and Mr. Engebretsen formed the developer, New
Canyon Meadows, LLC, which ultimately purchased the property, relying completely on
Jay Johnson's interaction with the FDIC and the knowledge he had gained through the
course of his due diligence. This fact is admitted by Mr. Engebretsen in his deposition,
at pages 43 and 44. (R. at 1706.)
Q. When did you first learn the purchase price?
A. I learned that purchase price when the deadline for Jay Johnson had to purchase
the property needed to be extended and we paid to extend the closing date for
approximately six weeks.
(R. at 1707.) Further, on page 68 of Mr. Engebretsen's deposition, Mr. Engebretsen was
asked:
Q. I take it, it sounds like Jay [Johnson] had done the initial, a certain amount of
due diligence work to tie this thing up in an option, and so forth: is that true?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. Were you relying on some of Jay's information and experience for purposes in
deciding to form Canyon Meadows and put this together?
A. Yes.
Not only was Mr. Engebretsen informed of Jay Johnson's knowledge and
interactions with the FDIC, the other partners in the newly formed company were also
kept informed by Jay Johnson of the troubling issues surrounding the property, such as
the percolation and water rights issues. In Jay Johnson's deposition, Jay Johnson was
asked ( R a t 1890.):
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Q. Did you discuss the "as is" nature of this property with any of your potential
partners?
A. Yes.
Q. With which partners?
A. All of them.
Q. Why did you discuss that with them?
A. So they knew we were buying it in that condition.
Q. Okay. Why was that relevant to you?
A. It's important to know that we were at risk.

Thus, it is obvious that there is a definite connection between Jay Johnson and the
developer. Without Jay Johnson, the developer would not exist and it would not have
purchased the property. Because Jay Johnson is the founding member, the developer and
the other members were informed of his knowledge and actions and admittedly relied on
his due diligence. His actions prior to the formation of the company in regards to
dealings with the FDIC can and should be imputed to the developer. See Hardy v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761, 767 (Utah 1988) ("courts generally impute
any knowledge of the agent to the company under the law of agency").
The intent of referencing the letters between Jay Johnson and the FDIC was
simply to show that the developer knew of the problems associated with the property and
that it obtained a reduced purchase price because the property clearly had problems
including, a serious lack of water. Jay Johnson made his partners aware of the problems
associated with the property because it was "important to know that [they] were at risk."
(R. at 1890.) The developer is now seeking to avoid the risk—the risk it was well aware
of at the outset—and foist it upon all the other property owners who purchased the
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property without knowledge of the water problems and who paid a premium price for
their lots.
It is also important to note that the developer also attempts to mislead the court to
believe that the water company is claiming some sort of agency relationship between
Mahli Development and the developer. This is simply not true. The water company only
asserts that it is Jay Johnson's knowledge and relationship that is at issue. The developer
points to two exhibits claiming they are letters written on the letterhead of Mahli
Development. (See the developer's brief at 11.) However, Exhibit 6 is clearly written on
Jay Johnson's letterhead, but more importantly every exhibit presented by the water
company is signed by Mr. Johnson. The developers arguments regarding Mahli
Development are misplaced and are a diversionary tactic to draw the court's attention
from Mr. Johnson, who is a founding member of the developer.
It should also be noted that Mr. Johnson's agency relationship to the developer has
already been recognized by the trial court and the developer did not object to the trial
court's determination of the agent/ principal relationship. Just before Mr. Johnson's
deposition, the water company learned Mr. Johnson had a duffel bag of documents and
was concerned that the developer would not turn over these documents. Therefore the
water company sought an order from the trial court requiring the developer to produce the
documents. At the conclusion of a telephone conference with counsel for both parties, the
court ordered the developer to turn over Mr. Johnson's documents, and in doing so the
court recognized the connection Mr. Johnson had to the developer: "Mr. Johnson is a
-9-

principal of a company, which in turn is a principal of the Plaintiff developer." (R. at
1749.) This statement in the lower court was never disputed or objected to by the
developer.
Furthermore, because this relationship between Jay Johnson and the developer was
clearly, repeatedly and unambiguously asserted by the water company at the lower court
(R. at 1960, 1957-19565, 2094-2093, 2088-2086), and because these assertions are
supported with ample evidence (R. at 1893-1866 and repeated at 2018-1991), the
developer has the burden to rebut the facts by presenting evidence to the contrary. Smith
v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, ^}40 (Once a moving party has presented
sufficient evidence, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence
creating an issue of material fact). The developer does not cite to the record where it
even raised this argument at the trial court level, and after reviewing the record, the water
company cannot find any evidence submitted to rebut the deposition and documentary
evidence presented by the water company. If this was a false and unfounded assertion of
fact, made in bad faith, one would think that the developer would have immediately
raised an objection at the trial court and presented its evidence to refute it, but such is not
the case. This agency relationship of Jay Johnson is not rebutted at all, and as such it is
the developer that has brought these claims in bad faith and the one that could rightly be
accused of malfeasance in this matter.
B. The Use of the Term "Developer" Is Appropriate to Describe NCM.
The developer has further charged the water company with bad faith and
attempting to mislead this Court in referring to " New Canyon Meadows" as a
"developer." (Developer's brief at 13.) The developer asserted that, "There is nothing in
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the record to suggest that New Canyon is a 'developer' with respect to the lots which it
purchased by Quit Claim Deed from the FDIC." ( Developer's brief at 11.)
Throughout this litigation, the water company, the lower court, and even the
developer's own counsel have consistently referred to NCM as a "developer." During
oral argument on January 23, 2001, an exhibit was used which marked the additional 76
lots of plat C in blue, and the following conversation took place:
Counsel for the Developer: What happened is when my clients purchased the
property from the FDIC they, they contemplated the possibility that they might
continue with the original development that had been planned by the original
developers.
Judge: Was blue then your own development?
Counsel for the developer: Yes, yes. Blue is our own development. * * * We
presently don't plan to develop the property outside of the, of the homeowners
subdivision area with 76 lots, we plan a development with larger lots with much
fewer lots on it.
(R. at 2398, page 9.) Additionally, the deposition of Jay Johnson indicates that the
developer considered itself a "developer" of all the lots it was purchasing. The following
question was posed to Jay Johnson:
Q. Okay. What kind of risk?
A. Well, first of all, we didn't know how many of the lots would percolate. That
was the major concern.
Q. Okay.
A. And we didn't know we'd ever be able to develop the property to any degree
beyond what was already there. So the conclusion is we didn't know how many
lots we could sell.
(R. at 1890.) (Emphasis added.)
Thus, contrary to the developer's adamant and hyperbolic assertions, there is
ample evidence in the record to suggest that NCM is a "developer" with respect to the lots
it purchased from the FDIC. The reference to NCM as a "developer" in the water
company's brief is completely based in fact and does not constitute an attempt to mislead
this Court as to the status of NCM as a "developer."

-li-

The sense in which the water company refers to NCM as a developer is in a
general sense—as a company that buys many lots to later subdivide or sell. The fact is,
NCM is a developer. While the water company does not seek sanctions against the
developer, it does ask this Court to recognize that the developer is the party making false
representations and seeking to mislead this Court.
C. There Is a Question of Fact Regarding the Sufficiency of Water in Canyon
Meadows.
The developer finishes up its motion seeking sanctions by asserting that the water
company is misleading the court when the water company states it is undisputed that there
is insufficient water for all of the lots in Canyon Meadows. (Developer's brief at 13.)
The statement of the water company referred to by the developer was made in the
summary of arguments and refers to the letter from Wasatch County, clearly stating there
is inadequate water, and until more is brought, only 70 lots could be sold. (R. at 90-89.)
The developer claims that this assertion is rebutted by Francis Smith, their expert witness.
The developer fails to point out their own witness concurs with the 70 lot limitation. Mr.
Smith states: "alternatively that [sic] based on the maximum rate of diversion (0.17 cfs
of water) there is sufficient project water to service 70 lots and/or units." (R. at 356, 546.)
It is the developer's engineer that is agreeing there is only enough water for 70 units, not
the 84 lots that are platted.
Furthermore, in trying to discredit the water company, the developer once again
uses inaccurate statements and misleads the court itself. The developer asserts that it was
the only party to provide competent evidence with respect to this issue. However, as
discussed above, this is clearly not a true statement. The water company provided
evidence from Dee Hansen, an extremely well qualified witness who has over 39 years of
experience as a water engineer and who served as the state's top official in water matters
and as the director of Utah's department of natural resources. Mr. Hansen testified the
water company did not have sufficient water rights to service all of the lots, especially
-12-

when considering irrigation and fire protection for the lots and the common areas. (R.
2025-2020.)
These continued misrepresentations on the part of the developer should not be
ignored, and in light of the developer's willingness to repeatedly make these unsupported
and defamatory statements, this Court should view their arguments and statements of fact
with a very careful and critical eye.
ARGUMENT
A. The Developer Does Not Have More Rights Than Its Predecessor-In-Interest.
The developer's argument that it is not bound by the original developer's actions
because there is no privity of contract is an unreasonable and untenable argument given
the facts of this case. Indeed, in Canyon Meadows 40 P.3d at 1148, involving the same
parties, the developer made the same argument before the Court of Appeals. In the above
recent Canyon Meadows case, the original developer entered into a series of open space
agreements with Wasatch County and the homeowners association, and the developer
agreed to deed open space associated with various plats to the association once the plats
were recorded. The NCM developer insisted that the words "successors, lenders, and
assigns" in the open space agreements did not bind the NCM developer to the agreements
because it had not taken the land subject to any agreement to be bound to the open space
agreements. The NCM developer argued that the agreements did not run with the land
even though the agreements where recorded at the county and stated they were to last for
the life of the development. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Canyon
Meadows homeowners association and found that "it would make little sense to agree to
an open space agreement that was to last 'the life of said development' if, in fact, the
rights created were merely personal and did not run with the land." IdL, at 1153.
The water company's argument in this case does not assume the existence of an
agreement between the original developer and the NCM developer, nor does it need to.
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The water company is arguing that the NCM developer, as a purchaser of the original
developer's lots, cannot have more rights than the original developer had. The water
company is claiming that if the developer wants to continue to develop the property and
sell more lots, it must bring additional water just like the original developer had to do.
If the original developer could not sell more than 70 lots without bringing more water,
then why should the new successor developer be able to sell more than 70 lots without
bringing additional water?
B. Equity Dictates That the Developer Must Bring Water to Become a Member of
the Water Company.
Part of the water company's argument is based in equity, and requires an
understanding of the events which have placed the parties in their current positions. The
original developer had two possible water sources, a right to 72 acre feet (0.17 cfs) and a
much larger right to 3.4 cfs. (R. 1940-1939.) It was based on these apparent rights that
the county allowed the Canyon Meadows development and the original developer was to
transfer all its water rights to the water company in exchange for water stock certificates.
(R. 1118-1103.) The original developer began selling lots and then on or about May 25,
1984, the original developer was informed by the state engineer (who was Dee Hansen)
that the claim to the 3.4 cfs was not recognizable or enforceable, and the right was, for all
practical purposes, extinguished. (R. 1906-1904.) This destroyed the water company's
ability to provide the required 1600 gallons per day for the planned 84 lots. Under county
requirements, the water company now only had enough water for 40 lots. The original
developer ultimately sold 30 lots, and only had water for ten more lots before it lost the
property, and the remaining lots and surrounding area went into bankruptcy.
The FDIC took title to the property and entered into negotiations with Jay Johnson
regarding its purchase. Jay Johnson researched the property and became aware of the
water and percolation problems associated with it. The FDIC ultimately reduced its price
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by roughly $400,000 because of these problems and sold it "as is" through a quit claim
deed to the developer.. (R. at 1873, 1871-1866, 1858.)
The only quit claim the water company can find makes no mention of any water
rights. ( R. at 1858.) But even if the developer could point to language in a quit claim that
does convey all water rights and water stock certificates, a quit claim deed only conveys
what the original developer had, which was enough water for ten more lots. The
successor developer knew of this lack of water for the remaining property, and it is clear
that the developer's agent argued before the FDIC that there was a serious lack of water
pertaining to the property. He negotiated a significant discount because of it, paying
roughly $60,000 less per lot than those who purchased with water rights or under the
representation that there were water rights. Having purchased what the original developer
had, the new developer only had enough water to sell ten lots, but it has sold 26 lots.
These sales took place with the representation to the buyers that adequate water existed.
(R. at 1938.)
Now there is a predicament. Initially, water share certificates either were not
issued or, as the water company believes, issued but no record exists. It is true that the
current lot owners do not have water share certificates and that the water company has
nevertheless been providing water. The water company, several years ago, decided to
make an accounting and begin issuing shares to come into conformity with its bylaws.
The only way it could foresee doing this was to require the lot owners to provide some
chain of title or equitable standing to establish themselves as members in the water
company.
The new developer knew of the water rights problems associated with the property
and made affirmative representations to the FDIC that insufficient water existed which
caused the FDIC to reduce the purchase price of the land. The developer should now be
estopped from taking one position with the government—that there is insufficient
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water—to get the land dirt cheap, and then taking another position with the water
company—that there is sufficient water and it is entitled to a pro-rata share—once it has
the land to sell at a premium price. This is fundamentally unfair to those property owners
who paid premium prices for their lots, roughly six to eight times more per lot, with the
representation, ofttimes by the NCM developer, that ample water existed.
For the new developer to say that it is entitled to a pro-rata share of water is like
the original developer, after it lost the second water source, saying to the lot owners, "I
thought I had enough water for 84 lots, but it turns out I only have enough water for 40
lots, but I'm going to continue to sell all the lots and you will have to purchase the extra
water rights, which will cost you hundreds of thousands of dollars." The new developer
stands in the same position as the original developer in this regard because it purchased
only the rights that the original developer had.
The developer cites the water company's response to an interrogatory as evidence
that the water company never issued any water stock certificates at any time.
(Developer's brief at 24.) The developer is mischaracterizing the content of the
statement, which is easy to do when one cites to documents not in the record. The water
company response was simply indicating that the water company does not have any
record of issued stock certificates—in other words, the water company does not have the
original transfer ledger or the physical stock certificates. The water company has alleged
that stock certificates were issued, as is evidenced by the assignment from the original
developer to the bank of water stock as security on the loan. That assignment indicated,
"Borrower (the original developer) is the owner of 57 shares of stock in the Canyon
Meadows Mutual Water Company, which shares are represented by 57 separate
certificates, the originals of which are attached hereto and made a part of this assignment
by reference." (R. at 2398, page 5.)

-16-

When Mr. Engebretsen took possession of the water company board, there were
many documents contained in the water company's files that became missing when the
prior board took control again. (R. at 2079-2078.) And so now the water company is
faced with the situation of having no stock ledger and the difficult task of recreating who
has stock ownership in the water company and who is entitled to water. This task is made
more difficult because of the history of the subdivision.
First, the water company was formed in the early 1980?s with the belief that the
original developer would transfer water rights to 3.4 cfs, more than enough water for 84
lots. (R. at 20095.) However, it was discovered that the original developer did not have
the rights to this water (R. at 2032-2030) and shortly thereafter the original developer lost
the property in bankruptcy. The FDIC held the property from the late 1980's until 1993
when it was purchased by the NCM developer. (R. at 1858.) Once the developer
purchased the majority of the lots, it used its votes to take over the water board and
control the water company. (R. at 2079-2078.) When the developer was removed from
the board many of the water company's documents were discovered to be misplaced or
missing.
Given the protracted history of transfers, bankruptcies, quit claim deeds and
changes in the board, the circumstances surrounding record keeping in the water company
are foggy at best. Nevertheless, because mere ownership of a lot within the service area
is insufficient to establish membership in the water company, some color of title or
equitable standing must exist before a lot owner is entitled to receive a pro-rata share of
water.
Due to the lack of evidence establishing which lot owners are legitimate members
of the water company, a bona-fide purchaser analysis is appropriate in this case. Other
than the developer, all other lot owners purchased their property with the explicit
representation that adequate water existed, and they paid a premium price for the lot. On
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the other hand, the developer had notice of the water rights deficiencies and already
received a huge reduction in the purchase price of the property. The developer is not a
bona-fide purchaser that would be entitled to membership in the water company and a
pro-rata share of what limited water there is.
The developer has also raised an equity argument, maintaining that equity dictates
it be granted membership in the water company and a pro-rata share of water.
(Developer's brief at 29-30.) The developer alleges that the negotiations of the property's
purchase price were critically affected by concerns regarding whether lots would
percolate, rather than concerns over water rights. (Developer's brief at 30.) Additionally,
without any citation to authority or to the record, the developer states that the letters
written by Mahli Development to the FDIC were by a person who did not have authority
to act for or on behalf of the NCM developer. (Developer's brief at 30.) The above
assertions by the developer raise questions of fact that should not have been decided on
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals has held that "questions about the relative
inequities borne by the parties tend to be intensely fact specific and can be best addressed
on remand." Id, at 1151, fh 4.
C. The Developer Is Not a Member of the Water Company and Is Not Entitled to a
Pro-rata Share of Water.
Once a lot owner in the service area brings water and is voted in to the water
company, then the bylaws provide that the subsequent transfer of the lot necessarily
entails a transfer of the water stock appertaining to the lot. (See Article II, Sections 1 and
2 by-laws, R at 2050-2049.) All of the developer's arguments assume that it has either
purchased the land from a member of the water company or that it brought water and
became a member of the water company. Without this assumption, the developer's
arguments regarding the contractual nature of the bylaws and articles and the water
company's duty to provide water to its shareholders may be correct, but are irrelevant.
Indeed, the developer's oft-cited passage from the bylaws—that the exclusive use of the
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water shall not be separated from the real property to which it is appurtenant—is
contained under Section 7, titled "Transfer of Membership." (R. at 189.) "Transfer" of
membership clearly presupposes membership, and the key issue is whether the developer
purchased its property from a member of the water company.
The water company contends that the developer is not a member of the water
company. There is no evidence on the record that indicates the developer is a member of
the water company, or that it purchased land from an entity that was a member of the
water company. To this extent, the lower court erred in finding that the developer was a
member of the water company. In fact, the same evidence was before the lower court
regarding the sales office, which is within the geographical boundary of the water
company's service area, but the lower court found that there was not enough evidence to
support the finding on summary judgment that it was entitled to water: "The Court also
did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the sales office is entitled to a pro rata
share of water from the water company." (R. at 2264.) This same analysis should have
been employed with regard to the developer's lots.
As noted in the water company's initial brief, the developer originally alleged that
it had in its possession duly signed, endorsed and delivered stock certificates issued by
the FDIC, but abandoned this argument when it could not produce the certificates. In any
event, the developer purchased the land with enough water for ten lots, and has sold 26
lots. Consequently, the developer owns no land with any color of title or equitable
standing to membership in the water company.
The developer argues that the mere purchase of a lot is sufficient consideration to
become a member of the water company. (Developer's brief at 20; r. at 2398, page 84.)
While it is a necessary condition for membership, it is not the only condition. The
developer's argument is akin to the erroneous logical deduction that because all dogs are
mammals, all mammals are dogs. It is a true statement that all members of the water
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company must own lots in the Canyon Meadows subdivision. But it does not necessarily
follow that all people who own lots in the subdivision are automatically members of the
water company. Indeed, the bylaws state that, "The corporation shall have one class of
member who shall be shareholders. The qualifications and rights of the members shall be
as follows: All members must be owners or purchasers of real property in the service
area." However, a literal reading of this section reveals that one is not automatically
entitled to membership in the water company by virtue of the mere purchase of a lot.
The developer cites the following language in support of its argument that the
mere purchase of a lot is sufficient to gain membership in the water company: "The
Bylaws expressly provide that each lot owner '[s]hall [sic] be entitled to share [of stock]
in the corporation for each separate lot or condominium owned by said member.'"
(Developer's brief at 18.) This is a misquote and misrepresentation of the meaning of the
passage in the bylaws. The misquote fails to recite the plain and unambiguous language
of the section. First, the actual quote should read: "Each member shall be entitled to one
share in the corporation for each separate lot or condominium owned by said member."
(R. at 190)(emphasis added.) The developer also fails to recognize that the section goes
on to clearly define certain requirements of becoming a member; namely that members
must be elected by the water board: "Members shall be elected by the governing board.
An affirmative vote of two thirds of the trustees shall be required for election."
The developer would have the court interpret the bylaws so as to give absolutely
no meaning to this section. The developer claims that any ownership of any property,
regardless of any other membership requirement, entitles it to a pro rata share. Indeed,
under the developer's approach, membership is irrelevant. This is directly contrary to the
meaning and intent of the agreement and such an interpretation should be rejected. The
water company has presented a much more reasonable and equitable approach to applying
this section, namely, to be a member a lot owner must show a good faith claim to water,
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based on representations made to them regarding when they purchased. Lot owners
without such a good faith claim could be required to meet additional requirements, such
as bringing the necessary water rights.
As the developer's approach is contrary to the plain language of the bylaws, its
interpretation should be rejected and the Court should find in favor of the water company
on this appeal.
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Which Preclude Summary Judgment.
There is only one contract provision capable of interpretation as a matter of law,
and that is that simple ownership of a lot in the Canyon Meadows subdivision does not
automatically entitle the owner to membership in the water company and a pro-rata share
of water. This Court must accept all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party
(the water company) when reviewing a grant of summary judgment. Canyon Meadows,
40P.3datll54.
The following are bona-fide issues of material fact that, when considered in the
light most favorable to the water company, preclude summary judgment and warrant a
remand to the lower court for a trial:
1) Is the developer a "member" of the water company?
2) Were valid stock certificates issued at one time?
3) Was it the parties' intention in drafting the governing documents to include all
property owners as automatic members in the water company?
4) Is it inequitable to enforce provisions when there was a change in
circumstances?
5) Should Jay Johnson's knowledge and actions be imputed to the developer.
The water company sufficiently raised genuine issues regarding all of the above
issues of fact. If the Court accepts these facts and inferences in the light most favorable
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to the water company, the only appropriate action under law is to remand to the lower
court for a determination at trial.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the forgoing arguments, the water company prays this Court to rule in
its behalf and to rule as follows:
1. to hold, based on the admission of the parties and documentary evidence, that
there is insufficient water to service all of the platted lots in the Canyon Meadows
subdivision, or, in the alternative, to hold that a question of fact exists requiring a remand
to the trial court for a trial on the merits of the issue of adequacy of water for the
subdivision;
2. to hold that a question of fact exists as to whether the developer is a member of
the water company and remand to the trial court for a determination at trial;
3. to hold that question of fact exists as to whether equity dictates that the current
developer is entitled to a pro-rata share of water in the water company;
4. to hold that water rights have not yet become appurtenant to the land owned by
the current developer; and
5. to hold that a question of fact exists as to whether the water company's service
area extends beyond the Canyon Meadows subdivision.
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